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Abstract Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies
(REMSs) with Elements to Assure Safe Use (ETASU) are
requested for drugs with significant safety risks. We
reviewed REMS programs issued since 2011 to evaluate
their rationales, characteristics, and consistencies, and
evaluated their impact on improving drug safety. We
conducted a literature search and a survey of relevant
websites (FDA, manufacturers, and REMSs). ETASU
characteristics were summarized. REMS risks were com-
pared with labeled risks, including black box warnings.
Forty-two programs were analyzed. Seven incorporated
drugs of the same class. Most drugs (57%) were indicated
for an orphan disease. A single risk was mentioned in 24
REMSs, and multiple risks in 18. Embryo-fetal toxicity and
abuse or misuse were the most frequent risks. All risks
were identified during clinical development but some were
hypothetical. Thirty-six drugs had a black box warning.
REMS risks and black box risks differed for 11 drugs. A
drug with multiple indications could have a REMS for one
of them but not for another. Most REMSs required pre-
scriber training and certification, half required dispenser
certification and patient enrolment. REMSs were revised
multiple times and only three (7%) were discontinued. No
data were available to establish whether REMSs were
effective in improving drug safety. Some REMSs were
deemed inefficient. REMSs with ETASU continue to be
implemented but their impact on improving drug safety is
still not documented. Hence, one of the main requirements
of the FDA Amendments Act of 2007 is not being
addressed. In addition, REMSs are complex and their logic
is inconsistent; we recommend a thorough re-evaluation of
the REMS program.
Key Points
Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMSs),
particularly ones that require elements to assure the
safe use of drugs, are operationally complex and
burdensome for physicians, pharmacists, drug
distributors, regulators, and manufacturers.
A demonstration of the impact of REMSs on
improving safety was a key request from the
legislator but, based on our review of public
information, this impact does not appear to have
been evaluated or made public.
We recommend that REMS programs should be
evaluated for their effectiveness to improve drug
safety. The results of this evaluation should be made
public.
1 Introduction
Approximately 10 years ago, the US Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) implemented a safety risk monitor-
ing system for new marketed drugs and for drugs already
on the market and for which a new risk was identified. The
Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy, or REMS [1],
requires multiple and complex processes, particularly
REMSs that include Elements to Assure Safe Use
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(ETASU). REMSs with ETASU are requested for drugs
that pose the most significant safety risks. These ETASU
involve the participation of physician prescribers and drug
companies but can also involve patients, pharmacists, and
drug distributors [2, 3].
Pre-existing drug safety monitoring systems, such as the
black box warning, have been frequently criticized [4–6]
and, in particular, concerns were raised because their utility
is difficult to evaluate [4]. Consequently, a key provision in
the FDA Amendments Act of 2007 was the mandate to
study the effectiveness of REMSs to evaluate their impact
on improving drug safety [1]. Logically, the addition of a
new and more complex system, such as REMSs with
ETASU, could only be justified if evidence-based results
demonstrate that such a process improves drug safety.
In 2013, the Inspector General of the Department of
Health and Human Services conducted an extensive eval-
uation of REMSs launched between 2007 and 2011. The
report concluded that the FDA could not determine whe-
ther REMSs were improving drug safety [7]. This report
highlighted that the federal agency did not have the
capacity to fulfill one of the most important aspects of the
Amendments Act of 2007, which was to verify that the
REMS system was efficient. Since this report, new REMSs
have been implemented, and few have been discontinued.
As REMSs accumulate, so does the administrative burden
and workload on the health system [8].
This study evaluates REMSs issued, or modified, from
December 2011 (right after the period covered by the
Inspector General report) until August 2015. The study
evaluates REMS rationale, characteristics, and consisten-
cies and evaluates whether the impact of REMSs to
improve drug safety could be documented. The focus was
on REMSs with ETASU, as these plans concern drugs that
pose the most significant safety risks.
2 Methods
REMSs requiring ETASU are requested for drugs that
represent the highest known, and clinically relevant, safety
concerns [9]. The main rationale for ETASU is to provide
patients with safe access to a drug that would otherwise be
unavailable to them. We evaluated the individual charac-
teristics of REMSs with ETASU that were issued from
December 2011 to September 2015. We searched the FDA
website (http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/rems/
index.cfm) to determine which of the following elements
were incorporated into REMSs with ETASU (points 3–6
being specific for ETASU):
1. A medication guide. This could, for instance, takes the
form of a patients’ package insert.
2. A communication plan to healthcare providers. This
plan may include letters or other means of communi-
cation (e-mail, website, professional societies).
3. An implementation system. This process is specific for
ETASUs and is intended for the sponsor of the drug to
monitor, evaluate, and eventually correct the level of
compliance by healthcare providers and pharmacists.
This system may also include wholesalers, distributors,
or other parties.
4. The need for certification. For drug prescribers and
drug dispensers (e.g., pharmacists), a certification
may be required to demonstrate their ability to
diagnose the condition, understand the risk/benefit
of the drug, read the educational material, and,
eventually, treat potential adverse drug reactions.
The certification might be temporary and renewable.
The certification process should be available online or
via mail. The cost of the certification process is
required to be ‘reasonable’ for the provider. Pharma-
cists’ certifications might require an agreement to fill
a prescription and dispense the drug only after
receiving prior authorization, checking laboratory
values, or checking for the presence of stickers.
Providers affix these stickers to prescriptions. Stick-
ers indicate that the patient has met all criteria for
receiving the product (‘qualification stickers’) to fill a
prescription. Pharmacists might also be required to
dispense a drug only within a specified period, as well
as to fill prescriptions only from enrolled prescribers.
5. The need to enroll patients. Patients may be required to
enroll in a registry. The registry can be used to
document that the drug is dispensed to patients with
documentation of safe-use conditions, or to document
that the patient is enrolled in a mandatory monitoring
system. The registry can collect clinical outcomes,
including safety information, compliance with pre-
scribing protocols, and assessment regarding the
impact of actions taken to ensure compliance.
6. The need to train prescribers. A prescriber’s training
generally requires the review of clinical documents,
successfully answering questionnaires, and the docu-
mentation of these activities.
For each REMS with ETASU, the number of versions
was documented, including the number of revisions fol-
lowing the first issue.
For each drug subjected to a REMS with ETASU, the
dedicated REMS website was accessed and the information
available on the FDA’s website was eventually completed.
The following information was compiled: the drug name
(USAN/trade name), the labeled indication(s), whether the
indication was covering an orphan disease or not, and the
clinical description of the safety risk(s).
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We identified REMSs with ETASU that were discon-
tinued. Discontinuations were first searched on the FDA
website, verified on the drug’s sponsor website by con-
sulting the Press Release section, and confirmed on each
REMS website address.
Last, for each drug subjected to a REMS with ETASU,
the drug package insert was reviewed for the presence of a
black box warning and to check whether the black box
warning risks matched the risks mentioned in the REMS.
A PubMed search was performed (http://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/pubmed) from 2007 to 2015 for publications con-
cerning REMSs. The key words used in the title field were
‘risk minimization’, ‘risk evaluation and minimization
strategy’, ‘REMS’, and ‘REMS with ETASU’.
A similar search was conducted on the FDA website,
with no time limits, with the additional term ‘REMS
working group’ (www.fda.gov). This last search was done
because the Inspector General and the FDA had agreed that
a working group would report on an evidence-based
approach that would evaluate the efficiency of REMSs by
March 2015 [7].
3 Results
Forty-two REMSs with ETASUs were issued, or modified,
during the study period.
We could not find data on the FDA’s website or from
FDA publications demonstrating the effectiveness of
REMSs to improve drug safety.
From the general literature, we identified five publica-
tions of interest. One study was conducted by a drug safety
consulting group on its claims database. It was a survey on
the effectiveness of the REMS medication guide for con-
veying information on the risks of varenicline [10]. Of the
3458 recipients surveyed, 18% responded. The study con-
cluded that the information received was generally well
understood. A second study evaluated the bosentan REMS
program for its compliance to a required monthly testing of
liver function [11]. The study was conducted by the same
consulting group in collaboration with the maker of the
drug. The study concluded that compliance was not
achieved. A third study evaluating retigabine/ezogabine
REMS was conducted by the maker of the drug and sur-
veyed pharmacists and physicians for their understanding
of the risk of urinary retention associated with the drug
[12]. Of the 1028 individuals surveyed, 22% of physicians
and 82% of pharmacists responded. The study demon-
strated an insufficient level of understanding of the risk,
especially among pharmacists.
An additional study on lenalidomide was conducted
right before REMS programs were implemented. The ini-
tial risk minimization program was later continued as part
of a REMS with ETASU [13]. The study was conducted by
the maker of the drug and concluded that, in the absence of
pregnancy report in female patients or female partners of
male patients, the program was effective in preventing fetal
exposure to the drug.
A recent study reported on an education program for
prescribers of extended-release/long-acting opioid anal-
gesics [14]. This continuing education program, mandated
by the FDA, was funded by the manufacturers of these
products. In the immediate period following the imple-
mentation of the program, the 2850 participants surveyed
demonstrated a significant improvement in the number of
correct responses to knowledge questions (from 60 to 84%)
and 82% of participants declared they were planning to
change their practice. After 2 months, however, when a
subset of 476 participants were tested, the results were an
improvement from 60 to 69, and 67% of participants
planned to change their practice, indicating that the posi-
tive effect was waning.
Of the 42 REMSs with ETASU, 35 were designed for a
single drug (Table 1), and seven were shared programs that
included multiple drugs of the same class (Table 2). These
shared programs were implemented across multiple
manufacturers.
The nature of the risks involved could be common to
more than one REMS (Table 3). The risk of birth
defect(s) or embryo-fetal toxicity and the risk of potential
abuse or misuse were the most frequent risks addressed in
REMSs with ETASU (8/42 [19%] and 6/42 [14%],
respectively). Some risks were mentioned in only one
REMS. These were biliary/pancreatic disorders; ischemic
colitis and complication of constipation; delirium, sedation,
and vision loss; severe neutropenia; and congestive heart
failure. Three risks addressed the appropriate conduct of
physicians’ practice. These were the adherence to the
prescribed regimen and counseling, mistake in blood glu-
cose reading, and tendon or cavernous body rupture fol-
lowing a local drug injection.
The risk(s) mentioned in a REMS with ETASU could be
single or multiple. For 24 REMSs, only a single risk was
identified (e.g., hepatotoxicity for mipomersen or bron-
chospasm for Adasuve). For 17 REMSs, multiple risks
were mentioned (e.g., progression of myelodysplastic
syndrome and acute myeloid leukemia, thromboembolism,
and bone marrow fibrosis for romiplostim).
All the risks mentioned were identified during the
clinical development program. Some, however, were not
documented with clinical data and remained hypothetical
(e.g., ischemic cardiac disease and possible acceleration of
neoplastic growth for teduglutide). In that case, the risks
could be inferred from the drug’s mechanism of action or
hypothesized based on non-clinical data. Some risks were
difficult for individual prescribers to evaluate as they were
REMS with ETASU Review
Table 1 Single REMSs with ETASU: drugs, sponsors, indications, nature of risk(s) and presence of a black box warning
Drugs Sponsor(s) Indication Risk(s) Black
box












Increase incidence of MI Yes
Icodextrin Baxter Peritoneal dialysis
solution
Incorrect blood glucose results Yes
Teduglutide Shire Short bowel syndrome Possible acceleration of neoplastic growth and enhancement of
colon polyp growth, GI obstruction, biliary and pancreatic
disorders
No
Lomitapide Aegerion Homozygous familial
hypercholesterolemia
Hepatotoxicity Yes
Mipomersen Sanofi Homozygous familial
hypercholesterolemia
Hepatotoxicity Yes
Ambrisentan Gilead Pulmonary arterial
hypertension
Serious birth defects Yes
Alosetron Prometheus Diarrhea predominant
IBS
Ischemic colitis Yes
Alglucosidase alpha Sanofi Pompe disease Anaphylaxis Yes
Mifepristone Danco Medical termination of
pregnancy
Life-threatening bleeding, infections, or other problems Yes
Mycophenolate Multiple Prophylaxis of organ
transplant rejection
Pregnancy loss and congenital malformations, other serious risks Yes
Romiplostim Amgen Chronic immune
thrombocytopenia
Progression of myelodysplasia and acute myeloid leukemia,
thromboembolism, marrow fibrosis
No
Pomalidomide Celgene Multiple myeloma Risk of embryo fetal exposure and other risks Yes
Eltrombopag GSK Chronic immune
thrombocytopenia
Hepatotoxicity, bone marrow fibrosis, thromboembolism Yes
Phentermine/topiramate Vivus Chronic weight
management





Vigabatrin Lundbeck Refractory complex
partial seizure
Vision loss Yes




Thalidomide Celgene Multiple myeloma
Erythema nodosum
Embryo-fetal toxicity Yes
Dofetilide Pfizer Atrial fibrillation
Flutter
Arrhythmia Yes
Bosentan Actelion Pulmonary arterial
hypertension





Adherence to regimen, control of HIV-1 status, counseling Yes
Natalizumab Biogen Multiple sclerosis Progressive multifocal leukoencephalopathy Yes
Clozapine Jazz Schizophrenia Severe neutropenia Yes
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clinical events that could have multiple etiologies (e.g.,
myocardial infarction with alvimopan) or were too rare to
be encountered in a practice with a limited number of
patients. For such rare events, the collection of data from a
large population and/or multiple prescribers could only
document an increased risk.
Of the 42 REMSs with ETASU, 36 drugs (including 31
individual drugs and five classes of drugs) had a label that
contained a black box warning. Six REMSs with ETASU
concerned a drug that did not have a black box. These
REMSs concerned four individual drugs (teduglutide,
romiplostim, phentermine/topiramate, and sacrosidase) and
Table 1 continued







Tendon rupture, anaphylaxis, corporal rupture Yes
Olanzapine Lilly Schizophrenia Mitigate risk of post-injection delirium/sedation syndrome Yes
Macitentan Actelion Pulmonary arterial
hypertension
Serious birth defect Yes













Pulmonary oil micro-emboli, anaphylaxis Yes
Metreleptin Aegerion Generalized
lipodystrophy
Neutralizing antibodies, risk of lymphoma Yes
Alemtuzimab Sanofi Relapsing multiple
sclerosis
Auto-immune conditions, infusion reactions, malignancies Yes
Sodium oxybate Jazz Narcolepsy CNS and respiratory depression, potential abuse/misuse, CI with




Chronic IBS Ischemic colitis, serious complication of constipation Yes
CI contra-indicated, CNS central nervous system, ETASU Elements to Assure Safe Use, GI gastro-intestinal, HUS hemolytic uremic syndrome,
IBS irritable bowel syndrome, MI myocardial infarction, REMS Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy
Table 2 Common REMSs with ETASU: drugs, sponsors, indications, nature of risk(s) and presence of a black box warning




Anemia of chronic kidney
disease and chemotherapy
Shortened survival, increased risk of tumor progression/
recurrence
Yes
Darbepoetin alpha Amgen Yes
Buprenorphine Multiple Opioid dependence Accidental overdose, misuse or abuse No
Buprenorphine and
naloxone
Multiple Opioid dependence Accidental overdose, misuse or abuse No
Extended-release and long-
acting opioid analgesics
Multiple Analgesia Addiction, abuse, and misuse Yes
Isotretinoin Multiple Severe recalcitrant nodular
acne
Severe birth defects Yes
Rosiglitazone and its
combinations
GSK Type 2 diabetes Ischemic cardiovascular risk Yes
Fentanyl Multiple Analgesia in cancer patients Mitigate the risk of misuse, abuse, addiction, overdose and
serious complications due to medication errors
Yes
ETASU Elements to Assure Safe Use, REMS Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy
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two classes of drugs (buprenorphine-containing products—
including transmucosal formulations—and buprenor-
phine/naloxone product combinations). There was no
apparent difference in the type of risks for drugs with a
black box warning and drugs without such a warning. For
instance, the same risks (misuse or abuse, thromboem-
bolism, birth defect, or acceleration of tumor growth) were
mentioned for drugs with or without black box warnings.
Apart from information contained in the drug label, the
severity or the frequency of the risk was generally not
quantified in REMS documents.
When a drug had a black box warning, the risks men-
tioned in the REMS with ETASU were similar to risks
mentioned in the black box for 33 drugs (23 individual
drugs and two grouped REMSs). Risks were dissimilar for
11 drugs (eight individual REMSs and three common
REMSs). In eight instances, fewer risks were mentioned in
the REMS than in the black box (six single REMSs and
two common REMSs). In three instances, more risks were
mentioned in the REMS than in the black box (two single
REMSs and one common REMS). No rationale could be
identified to explain these discrepancies. For extended-re-
lease and long-acting opioid analgesics, REMSs included
drugs with and without black box warnings.
A drug approved for multiple indications could be
submitted for a REMS with ETASU for one indication but
not for another indication. For instance, topiramate was
subjected to a REMS when used in combination with
phentermine, indicated for weight management, but was
not submitted for a REMS when indicated for epilepsy and
migraine. Similarly, mifepristone was subjected to a REMS
with ETASU for the medical termination of intra-uterine
pregnancy (one 600-mg dose) but not for the treatment of
Cushing’s syndrome (300 mg daily, continuously).
Some medical specialties, such as neuropsychiatry,
cardiovascular medicine, endocrinology and metabolic
diseases, and oncology, were more frequently concerned by
REMSs with ETASU than other specialties (Table 4).
Most drugs (24/42, or 57%) that were subjected to
REMSs with ETASU were indicated for an orphan disease.
The most frequent indication was pulmonary arterial
hypertension for which four drugs shared a risk of birth
defects. Each of these drugs had an individual REMS
program.
The processes that were included in REMSs with
ETASU were, in order of decreasing frequency, an
implementation system (81% of REMSs), prescriber
training (71%), prescriber certification (69%), a medication
Table 3 Risks addressed in
REMSs with ETASU
Risks Number of drugs
Birth defect(s) or embryo-fetal toxicity 8
Potential abuse or misuse 6
Allergic reaction 5






Bone marrow fibrosis 2
Biliary/pancreatic disorders 1
Ischemic colitis and complication of constipation 1
Delirium, sedation, and vision loss 1
Severe neutropenia 1
Congestive heart failure 1
Adherence to regimen and counseling 1
Incorrect blood glucose reading 1
Tendon or cavernous body rupture after a local injection 1
ETASU Elements to Assure Safe Use, REMS Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy
Table 4 Medical specialty concerned with REMS with ETASU






ETASU Elements to Assure Safe Use, REMS Risk Evaluation and
Mitigation Strategy
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guide (67%), dispenser certification (48%), patient enrol-
ment (43%), and a communication plan (26%).
REMSs with ETASU had to go through multiple revi-
sions. The mean number of revisions was 3.3 (range 1–11).
Three of the 42 REMSs with ETASU (7%) were dis-
continued (Table 5).
4 Discussion
A REMS is mandated by law and includes specific mea-
sures to ensure that the benefits of a drug outweigh its risks
[1]. A REMS may be required by the FDA as part of a new
drug approval process, or for an approved product when
new safety information emerges. One of the key provisions
in establishing REMSs was to ensure that the FDA can
evaluate the impact of such programs and thus demonstrate
their relevance in addressing and preventing safety risks
[1, 7]. In February 2013, the Office of the Inspector Gen-
eral issued a comprehensive report covering REMSs issued
since their implementation in 2007 until the end of 2011
[7]. This report concluded that the FDA did not have rel-
evant data to determine whether REMSs improve drug
safety and, despite the significant burden and cost associ-
ated with the REMS system, the relevance of these pro-
grams could not be established.
Our study’s first objective was to establish whether the
situation regarding the relevance of REMSs has changed
since the Inspector General’s report and whether the impact
of REMSs to improve drug safety could now be estab-
lished. Our second objective was to establish the charac-
teristics of REMSs with ETASU, as these REMSs address
drugs with the most significant safety risk.
Since the report from the Office of the Inspector Gen-
eral, 42 new REMSs with ETASU have been issued (35
programs for individual drugs, and seven programs incor-
porating more than one drug). Our study confirms that there
is still only very limited information publicly available to
demonstrate that REMSs with ETASU address and/or
prevent safety risks [14]. While data on REMS
effectiveness might have been collected, they have not
generally been made public by regulators, sponsors, or
scientists. This is contrary to the public commitment made
by the FDA in its response to the Inspector General’s report
[7]. Despite the burden that REMSs represent, it is still not
possible to conclude whether they are useful or not.
REMSs continue to be requested and continue to be
implemented despite the fact that the original intent of the
law that established the REMS system has not been
fulfilled.
The two most frequent risks addressed in the REMSs
with ETASU we reviewed were the risk of embryo-fetal
toxicities and the risk for drug abuse.
Since the thalidomide tragedy [15], the risk of embryo-
fetal toxicity has been a priority for regulators; it is thus not
a surprise to see this risk prominently addressed in REMSs.
More surprising, however, is the great variability of the
level of embryo-fetal risk associated with drugs submitted
to a REMS. The very high risk of embryo-fetal toxicity of
oral retinoids used to treat severe and refractory acne is
well known. This risk is further amplified as patients
affected by this type of acne are mostly young females of
reproductive age [16]. Over the years, multiple initiatives
have been taken to try to prevent women from becoming
pregnant while on retinoids. Few have been judged satis-
factory [17]. It is thus logical to incorporate the prescrip-
tion of oral retinoids into a REMS with ETASU. Oral
retinoids are included in a common REMS that is shared
between manufacturers. To our knowledge, it is not known
whether this program adequately addresses and prevents
the risk of embryo-fetal toxicity [18].
For other drugs, the risk of embryo-fetal toxicity is
variable. For thalidomide itself and lenalidomide, a
derivative of thalidomide, the potential of these drugs to
induce embryo-fetal toxicity is evidently high. These
drugs, however, are indicated for the treatment of multiple
myeloma and the population affected by this disease is
generally not at risk of pregnancy. Indeed, a multiple
myeloma is very rarely diagnosed during a woman’s
reproductive years [13, 19]. Additionally, the treatment of
Table 5 Discontinuation of REMS with ETASU
Drug Indication Risk Reason for discontinuation
Eltrombopag Thrombocytopenia in chronic
immune thrombocytopenia
Progression of MDS and AML,
thromboembolism, marrow fibrosis
Not available
Romiplostim Thrombocytopenia in chronic
immune thrombocytopenia
Hepatotoxicity, bone marrow fibrosis,
thromboembolism
Not available
Lumizyme Pompe disease Anaphylactic reactions Drug considered similar to Myozyme
Rosiglitazone and its
combinations
Type 2 diabetes mellitus Ischemic cardiovascular risk Risk not documented (replaced by risk
of congestive heart failure)
AML acute myeloid leukemia, ETASU Elements to Assure Safe Use, MDS myelodysplastic syndromes, REMS Risk Evaluation and Mitigation
Strategy
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multiple myeloma incorporates multiple chemotherapeutic
drugs that, while they are themselves embryo-toxic, are not
submitted to a REMS with ETASU [19]. While the situa-
tion is somewhat illogical, regulators probably could not
avoid including thalidomide and its derivative into a
REMS. In these cases, the logic could be to prevent
reproductive-aged females in contact with patients to have
access to the drugs or could be more an issue of public
perception in the context of the tragedy mentioned.
The case of topiramate is also interesting. When indi-
cated for the management of obesity, topiramate is for-
mulated in an extended-release form. Topiramate is known
to be associated with a risk of birth defect, however the risk
appears relatively low [20]. At the same time, when used to
treat migraine (a disease that mostly affects women in their
reproductive age), topiramate is not subject to a REMS. It
could be speculated that the true intent of the REMS was to
limit prescriptions for the management of obesity, as the
risk of birth defect would have increased with a large
number of prescriptions, or to indirectly address other
potential risks associated with the drug, such as the car-
diovascular risks [21].
Four drugs indicated for chronic pulmonary hyperten-
sion, a rare orphan disease, share a risk of embryo-fetal
toxicity. Each drug is subjected to an individual REMS
with ETASU. The patient population is not only at high
risk for pregnancy, but is also one for whom a pregnancy
could have severe consequences for the health of the
mother. In this case, the request for a REMS with ETASU
appears logical. Unfortunately, each individual REMS has
its own specific processes, and the burden for patients and
prescribers would certainly be minimized with the imple-
mentation of a shared REMS.
The risk of drug abuse, particularly opioid abuse, with
pain medications has been a longstanding and vexing
problem. Despite multiple actions taken over the years, a
definitive solution has not been found [22]. The imple-
mentation of REMSs with ETASU is another attempt to
control access to opioids. While there are no data to indi-
cate that this shared REMS is more effective than previous
attempts, the recent admission by the FDA that a complete
overhaul was necessary [23] indicates that the current
system is no better than its predecessors. Beyond embryo-
fetal toxicity and opioid abuse, the other risks identified in
REMSs, such as allergic reaction, hepatotoxicity, or
thromboembolism, were of varying severity. These risks
are also associated with drugs that are not submitted to
REMSs. For instance, allergic reactions with commonly
prescribed drugs not subjected to a REMS can nevertheless
be life-threatening or fatal and continue to affect many
patients [24]. The same is true for the risk of throm-
boembolism, which can be fatal and is associated with
widely prescribed drugs that are not subjected to REMSs
[25, 26]. Overall, the rationale that supports the incorpo-
ration of a drug into a REMS is certainly difficult to
establish for regulators and this issue was not foreseen by
the legislator.
The risks addressed in a REMS with ETASU were
generally documented during the drug development pro-
gram of a candidate drug and were identified before the
drug was approved. Some risks, however, such as an
increased incidence of tumor progression or an increase in
cardiovascular events, could not be documented with the
available data and remained speculative. Such risks,
because of their lack of specificity and their rarity, cannot
be identified at the level of individual prescribers. It thus
remains questionable whether such REMSs fulfill the ini-
tial intent of the program.
Most drugs that were included in a REMS with ETASU
also had a black box warning in their label. The content of
black box warnings and the content of REMSs were fre-
quently divergent without apparent reasons. The black box
warning system has been previously criticized and is gen-
erally considered inefficient [4–6, 27, 28]. In this context,
regulators might be tempted to supplement a black box
warning with a REMS with ETASU. REMSs, however, are
immensely more complex and logistically challenging that
black box warnings. There is thus a legitimate concern that
the legislator added an unproven, cumbersome system on
top of a potentially ineffective but simple system. Addi-
tionally, a significant number of REMSs with ETASU were
requested for drugs that did not have a black box warning
in their label. The rationale for requesting a REMS in such
cases could be debatable.
Most REMSs with ETASU were implemented for drugs
that were indicated for a rare orphan disease. In this case,
regulators might be requesting REMSs with the objective
to continue to collect safety information while favoring
early patient access to life-saving medication. However, in
the absence of data to evaluate the efficiency of REMS, this
remains speculative. In the context of conditional approval
for orphan drugs and for oncology drugs, post-marketing
data collection is necessary to get a final approval [29, 30]
and can be more informative that REMS. Also, patient
registries that become the norm for rare orphan diseases
provide useful clinical information, including safety
information [31]. For many orphan drugs, registries are an
efficient way to collect safety information that could be
evaluated against the REMS system. Finally, most patients
affected by an orphan disease are under the care of highly
specialized physicians who are likely to manage any risks
in a prudent and efficient way. With these considerations,
the benefits of orphan diseases REMSs remain unproven.
Having multiple REMSs for the same orphan indication
renders medical practice more cumbersome and, ulti-
mately, could result in limiting patient access to lifesaving
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medications, which would be the exact opposite of the
legislator’s intent.
The processes requested as part of a REMS with
ETASU highlight their complexity and administrative
burden. Multiple parties are involved and significant
operational challenges must be addressed. REMS revisions,
mostly dedicated to procedural details, are frequent and
slow to implement. Very few REMSs with ETASU were
discontinued and when they were, no rationale was made
publicly available, or the rationale was difficult to under-
stand [32]. While REMSs can be negotiated between the
FDA and a drug manufacturer, the FDA has sole decision
power. In this context, the negotiation, implementation, or
potential discontinuation, of a REMS is particularly chal-
lenging for small drug manufacturers who do not have the
necessary staff and must contract these functions out at a
significant additional cost. It also appears challenging for
regulators to implement REMS programs across multiple
review divisions in a consistent and logical manner.
5 Conclusion
The current REMS system does not appear to meet the
intent of the law which requested a mandatory evaluation
of these programs to demonstrate that they were improving
drug safety. The decision-making process to require a
REMS is not transparent and results in programs that
contain inconsistent processes and unclear objectives. Each
year, new REMS are issued, and very few are discontinued,
but today, it is still unknown whether the REMS system is
useful or not. While risk minimization strategies are always
difficult to implement [33, 34], we have identified multiple
challenges that need to be addressed.
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